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NOTES
Politics and Foreign Direct Investment:
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency and the Calvo Clause
Christopher K. Dalrymple*
Introduction
Throughout the twentieth century, various international organizations
attempted to spur and increase foreign direct investment' in less-developed
* J.D., Cornell Law School, 1996; B.A., Colgate University, 1990. I would like to
thank my wife, Beth, and my parents, Frank and Christie Dalrymple, for all their support
throughout all my academic pursuits.
1. This Note will concentrate on foreign direct investment, the type of international
equity investment by an alien in a foreign country that is most implicated by the Calvo
Doctrine. There are other means of investing, however. These other types of investment
include: various bilateral aid programs and project loans, the loans of international
development lending institutions, i.e., the World Bank and the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, loans from banking consortia, direct loans from foreign banks, etc. See gen-
erally CtiAmus OmAN, NEw FoRms op INTEmNATONAL INVESMrr IN DEVELOPING
CoUNuEs (1984). However, after the recent peso crisis in Mexico, these types of invest-
ing may be scaled back, making foreign direct investment (FDI) even more critical to the
development of Latin America. David L. Aaron, After GATT, U.S. Pushes Direct Invest-
ment, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1995, at A18.
One claimed advantage of FDI is that it is not a debt instrument requiring regular
debt-service payments (payments which can affect a developing country's balance of
payments). Only when a foreign investor's business earns a profit will any payments by
a developing country be involved. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Factors Influencing the Flow of
Foreign Investment and The Relevance of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Scheme, 21
ITrr'L LAW. 671, 675 (1987). Thus, part of the risk of the investment is transferred from
the developing country and onto the foreign investor. Id.
Indirect advantages of FDI include:
[that] direct investment does not simply provide funds, but an integrated pack-
age of financial resources, managerial skills, technical knowledge, and market-
ing connections .... Other indirect but important attributes of this form of
capital relate to benefits that ensue from the introduction of efficient and inter-
nationally competitive enterprises into the local economy.
Id. Finally, FDI is "also substantially involved with import substituting and export
industries, so the foreign trade performance of enterprises based on direct investment
can have a significant effect on [a developing country's] balance of payments." Klaus P.
29 COI UL INT'L LJ. 161 (1996)
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countries through an investment guarantee agency.2 Despite these efforts,
no international investment guarantee agency existed until 1986, when the
World Bank created an investment insurance program known as the Multi-
lateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). 3 Its creators envisioned
encouraging the .flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to and among
developing countries by issuing guarantees against non-commercial risks
present in these types of transactions. 4
Latin American countries were among the intended beneficiaries of
this new agency.5 During the 1980s, less-developed countries, particularly
Latin American ones, experienced a dramatic decrease in the amount of
non-direct foreign investment, i.e., foreign loans, made available to them.6
At the same time, Latin American countries' need for foreign direct invest-
Berger, The New Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Globalizing the Investment
Insurance Approach Towards Development, 15 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 13, 19 (1988).
Because of these advantages, many Latin American countries with large debt obliga-
tions turned their focus from commercial loans back to FDI. The Latin American debt
crisis in particular was responsible for a drastic reduction in net voluntary commercial
bank lending to less-developed countries. STjN CLAEssENs, ALTnVE Fomis OF Ex-re-
NAL FINAcE 1 (World Bank Working Paper No. 812, 1991). Further, when global FDI
flows began increasing in the late 1980s, the percentage of foreign direct investment
flowing to developing countries, including Latin American ones, fell. Recent Trends in
FDIfor the Developing World, FIN. & DEv., Mar.-1992, at 50.
2. See generally THEODOR MERON, INVESTMENT INSURANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-
37 (1976). See alsoJ. Voss, The Protection and Promotion of Private Investment in Develop-
ing Countries-An Approach Towards a Concept for a European Policy on Foreign Investment,
18 COMMON Moor. L. REV. 363 (1981). Efforts to establish some type of multilateral
investment guarantee agency began in the 1950s. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency, 20 INT'L LAw. 485, 485 (1986). Organizations such as the
World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Inter-
American Development Bank, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment, and the European Community participated in these efforts and discussions. Id.
At the time, none of the efforts or discussions led to the creation of such a multilateral
investment guarantee agency. Id.
3. Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, openedfor signature Oct. 11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1598 (entered into force April 12, 1988) [hereinaf-
ter MIGA Convention]. The World Bank was established at the Bretton Woods Confer-
ence in 1944 to help fund reconstruction in Europe after World War II. Today, the
Bank's primary function is to finance investments for development in its member
nations. This function specifically includes the promotion of development in Third
World and other less-developed countries. Airct.Es OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
BANK FOR REcoNsTiucrION Am DEVELOPMENT art. I. (1945).
4. Ibrahim F.L Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes:
The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV. FOREIGN Nv. LJ. 1, 13 (1986).
5. Id. at 19. "Latin American," as used herein, refers only to those nations with an
Iberian background, namely, Mexico, the five Central American Republics, Panama, the
Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the ten South American States. When this Note intends
to limit the discussion to a certain subset of the above listed countries, it will clearly
signify this limitation to the reader.
6. FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT rN DEVELOPING CouN'RIEs 3, 3-4 (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Occasional Paper No. 33, 1985). For a general discussion of the macroeconomic
factors affecting the flow of foreign direct investment, see Shihata, supra note 1, at 671.
See also Malcolm D. Rowat, Multilateral Approaches to Improving the Investment Climate of
Developing Countries: The Cases of ICSID and MIGA, 33 HARv. INT'L UJ. 103, 103-04
(1992) for a discussion on how the investment climate of the 1980s affected Latin Amer-
ican countries in particular.
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ment grew in inverse proportion to the decline in available dollars. 7 Thus,
the benefits of an investment insurance agency would seem to be particu-
larly attractive to these countries. However, while most Latin American
countries are eager to attract FDI flows, for many years they have been
reluctant to enter into any type of international investment agreement.8
Some commentators believe the main cause of this reluctance is the
continued use of "Calvo clauses" in Latin American contracts and constitu-
tions.9 These clauses are named for the doctrine formulated by the Argen-
tinian jurist Carlos Calvo in the mid-1800s in response to European
diplomatic intervention in Latin America.10 The doctrine's two basic prin-
ciples are: (1) the "national treatment standard," which provides that for-
eigners should not be granted more rights and privileges than those
accorded nationals; and (2) the "diplomatic intervention" provision that
foreign states may not enforce their citizens' private claims by violating the
territorial sovereignty of host states either through diplomatic or forceful
intervention.' 1
Thus, for an agency like MIGA to be successful in Latin America, it
must overcome the Calvo principles contained in certain countries' consti-
tutions and statutes. MIGA's proponents, however, claim that Calvo Doc-
trine principles are "overvalued," if not irrelevant, in the context of modern
international law.12 They also believe that even if Calvo principles are still
relevant, the World Bank has designed an agency that can coexist with
these principles so that Latin American countries can still become signato-
ries of the MIGA Charter.' 3
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin
America. Focusing on the Latin American countries that are members of
the Andean Common Market (ANCOM), Part II shows the influence of
Calvo Doctrine principles on certain ANCOM Decisions. Part III of this
Note discusses the general terms and provisions of the Multilateral Invest-
ment Guarantee Agency. Part IV examines how the Calvo Doctrine is
embodied in, and used by, a wide variety of contemporary legal theories,
instruments, and laws. Finally, Part V shows that even if MIGA is success-
ful in attracting Latin American nations as signatories, Calvo Doctrine
principles in the MIGA Convention and Latin American laws may prevent
MIGA from attaining its goal of increasing the flow of foreign direct invest-
ment to Latin America.
7. Shihata, supra note 1, at 672-73.
8. James C. Baker & Lois J. Yoder, ICSID and the Calvo Clause a Hindrance to For-
eign Direct Investment in LDC's, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. REsOL 75, 89-90 (1989).
9. Id.
10. DAEat. SHEA, THE CAtvo CLAUSE 16 (1955). For a brief biography of Carlos
Calvo, see Percy Bordwell, Calvo and the "Calvo Doctrine," 18 GnRm BAG 381 (1906).
11. SHEA, supra note 10, at 19.
12. Shihata, supra note 4, at 3.
13. Id. at 24-25.
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I. The Calvo Clause
A. Historical Overview
In the early 1800s, Latin American nations who had recently achieved
independence from the colonial powers eagerly sought foreign invest-
ment.' 4 Shielding their local economies from foreign penetration was of
secondary concern.15 To encourage investment by foreigners, 16 these
countries' new constitutions promised foreigners equality of treatment
with nationals, which was surprising in light of the lingering political hos-
tility towards many European nations and the United States.' 7 The effort
by these countries to attract foreign investment was initially a great
success.
18
By 1833, however, every Latin American bond issue was in default,
and most of the foreign companies established to conduct business in the
area had collapsed. 19 In the following years, foreigners as well as nationals
were exposed to economic losses. 20 The inability of Latin American gov-
ernments and judicial institutions to protect foreigners' property led many
foreigners to appeal to their governments for relief either through diplo-
matic intervention or the use of armed force. 2 1 Diplomatic protection even-
tually became an institutionalized legal technique justified by appeals to
treaties, state practice, and legal commentators.22
These requests for relief did not fall upon deaf ears in the foreigners'
home states, and the instances of diplomatic intervention were wide-
14. GEORGE PENDLE, A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 110-11 (1963). Spain and Portugal
were the main colonial powers in Latin America, and most of their colonies gained inde-
pendence between 1810 and 1820. These independence movements were successful
because both Spain and Portugal were occupied by Napoleon's armies during the Napo-
leonic Wars and found it impossible to maintain control over their American posses-
sions. Id. at 87, 92.
15. Id. at 161.
16. The small class of wealthy landowners, or caudillos, who effectively ruled these
newly independent countries, actively solicited foreign investment. Id. Foreign capital
could provide many benefits for an astute caudillo. Those in political power found that
"one of the surest supports of their regimes was the favour of foreign investors and com-
mercial enterprises. Foreign money enabled [them] to enrich [their] friends and to win
over some ... of [their] enemies." Id.
17. Id. at 164, 167. In many cases, hostility that had been latent while the caudillos
were in power became open upon their deaths or when their regimes toppled. After the
death of the Venezuelan caudillo, Juan Vincente Gomez, "[a] mob went through the
streets of Caracas sacking the houses of his . . . collaborators .... [T]he wives and
children of the foreign oil men were rushed to safety because rioters threatened to set
fire to the wells." Id. at 167.
18. Id. at 162.
19. For an overview of Latin American history at this particular time, see DESMOND
PLATT, FINANCE, TRADE AND POLITICS IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY (1968).
20. SHEA, supra note 10, at 12-13.
21. Id. at 10.
22. Id. See also EMER VAr.EL, THE LAw OF NATIONS (1916). One of the influential
commentators at the time, Vattel believed that a state which injured an alien also injured
the alien's state. Id. at 161-62. Unlike Calvo, Vattel viewed the state primarily in terms
of personal sovereignty rather than in terms of territorial jurisdiction. Id.
VCol. 29
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spread.23 One of the most notorious examples was known as the '3ecker
claim." J.B. Jecker and Company, a Swiss-French bank, arranged a loan to
the Mexican government of up to 75,000,000 francs.24 Although Mexico
borrowed only 3,750,000 francs, it went into default on this entire
amount.25 Ostensibly in response to this default, France's Napoleon III
invaded Mexico, where he maintained a puppet emperor until 1867.26
B. The Formulation and Principles of the Calvo Doctrine
In response to these and other instances of diplomatic intervention, Carlos
Calvo formulated what has come to be known as the Calvo Doctrine. 27 As
contained in Calvo's publications and correspondence between 1868 and
1896, the Calvo Doctrine advocated that: (1) sovereign states, being inter-
nationally equal and independent, enjoy the right to absolute freedom
from interference by other states, either through force or diplomacy;28 and
(2) while aliens should be given equal treatment with nationals, 29 they are
not entitled to "extra" rights and privileges and thus may only seek redress
in local courts. 30 This second tenet meant that foreigners could not appeal
23. Id. at 12. Diplomatic intervention had its origin in the following context
Nationals often felt entitled to complete security of their persons and property,
and appealed to their governments on rather flimsy evidence and without any
real effort to obtain local redress. The petitioned government, acting on limited,
one-sided evidence, and often under domestic political pressure, sponsored
claims that frequently were not based upon strict justice. Utilization of armed
forces to compel the weaker nations to honor these dubious claims was not
infrequent, and it sometimes happened that the severity of the measures
adopted in seeking compensation for the alleged injuries was far out of propor-
tion to the extent of the initial damages suffered.
Id.
24. Id. at 14.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. SHEA, supra note 10, at 17-19. The Doctrine was not articulated by Calvo in any
one specific work. Rather, it was arrived at through an amalgamation of his writings
and correspondence. Id. at 17.
28. Id. See generally FRANK DAwsON & IvAN HEAD, INTERNATIONAL LAW, NATIONAL
TRIBUNALS AND THE RIGHTs OF AuENS (1971). Dawson and Head argue that this assump-
tion of the independence and equality of states is critical to the Calvo conception of
diplomacy. Id. at 26.
29. Edwin Borchard, The "Minimum Standards" of the Treatment of Aliens, 38 MicH.
L. REv. 445, 447, 450 (1940). This equality of treatment standard is still favored today
by most Latin American countries. See Ewell E. Murphy, The Andean Decisions on For-
eign Investment: An International Matrix of National Law, 24 INT'L LAw. 643, 649
(1990). The responses of many industrialized countries has made it clear that they
expect national treatment to remain within the boundaries of an international minimum
standard. Borchard, supra, at 451-52. Borchard furthermore asserted that:
[t]he doctrine of absolute equality-more theoretical than actual-is. . . incom-
patible with the supremacy of international law. The fact is that no state grants
absolute equality or is bound to grant it. It may even discriminate between
aliens, [and] nationals of different states .... While states naturally desire a free
hand in dealing with all their inhabitants and while it is probably embarrassing
to be restrained by treaty or international law in perpetrating excesses, this is
one of the conditions of international intercourse.
Id. at 452.
30. EDWIN BORcHARD, THE DIPLOMATIc PROTECrION OF CrrENs ABROAD 793 (1915).
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to their states for diplomatic intervention except in the event of a denial of
justice.31
Calvo further believed that recognizing the independent international
law concept would result in "an exorbitant and fatal privilege, especially
favorable to the powerful states and injurious to weaker nations, by estab-
lishing an unjustifiable inequality between nationals and foreigners." 32
Calvo argued that European nations applied a double standard of interna-
tional morality and responsibility.33 He believed that these countries only
intervened in each other's affairs when some important principle was at
stake.34 In their relations with Latin America, however, Calvo felt that the
intervention of European states did not rest on any legitimate principles,
but rather upon pretexts. 35
C. The Calvo Doctrine in Practice
1. Overview
Most Latin American nations responded to the formulation of the Calvo
Doctrine and its principles with great enthusiasm.36 Although attempts to
include principles of the doctrine in treaties with European nations were
not initially successful, the concepts were incorporated into agreements
among Latin American states. 37 Many states included Calvo clauses in
their constitutions and in contracts with foreigners.38 Nevertheless, inves-
tors who insisted on diplomatic intervention challenged the validity of
these Calvo clause provisions.39
Furthermore, while Calvo clauses in some instances did allow a for-
eign investor to seek diplomatic protection in the event of a "denial of jus-
tice," most Latin American countries defined "denial of justice" quite
31. CARUos CALvo, LE DRorT INTERNATIONAL 231 (5th ed. 1870). See also Bordwell,
supra note 10, at 377 (agreeing with Calvo that it would be improper for an aggrieved
alien to bypass the local legal system and request diplomatic intervention where the laws
of the host State did not "conflict with the law of nations.")
This Note does not define "denial of justice" because the actions or behavior the
phrase encompasses have never been truly specified. Instead, most discussion has cen-
tered on the elasticity of the term, itself viewed as a breeding ground for abuse. See infra
note 40 and accompanying text.
32. CALvO, supra note 31, at 350-351.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. One commentator stated that,
Practically all the great powers have at different times resorted to a display of
force to give moral support to a request for the protection of nationals in foreign
countries or for the redress of injuries inflicted upon nationals .... There seems
little doubt that the great powers in their ready resort to ultimatums and threats
of the use of force to exact the payment of pecuniary claims, particularly in
Latin-America, have often abused their rights and have inflicted gross injustice
upon weak states.
BORCHARuD, supra note 30, at 447.
36. SHEA, supra note 10, at 21.
37. JosephJ. Jova, Private Investment in Latin America: Renegotiating the Bargain, 19
Tax. INT'L LJ. 3, 12 (1984).
38. Id. at 12-13.
39. Id. at 13.
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narrowly, thus limiting foreigners' ability to seek diplomatic protection.
This limitation led to protests by other nations who believed that the Calvo
Doctrine, by framing foreign investors' rights solely in terms of local Latin
American standards, denied any concept of an international minimum
standard of justice.40
Calvo's insistence that aliens first take their disputes to local tribunals
led to constitutional enactments and other legislation in Latin America as
early as 1886.41 These enactments made municipal courts a compulsory
first stop for foreigners with claims against a Latin American state, thereby
codifying and strengthening the exhaustion of local remedies rule.42
2. North American Dredging Company
North American Dredging Co. of Texas v. United Mexican States,43 heard in
1926 by the U.S.-Mexican Claims Commission, contains one of the most
significant discussions of the enforceability of a Calvo clause in a contract
between a state and foreign investor.44 In 1923, the governments of the
United States and Mexico established the U.S.-Mexican General Claims
Commission, an arbitral tribunal, to hear cases involving personal and
property injuries that occurred during and following the Mexican revolu-
tion of 1910.45 The North American Dredging Co. case reversed prior
caselaw and upheld the validity of a Calvo clause as a bar to a claim against
Mexico for breach of contract.46
In this case, a U.S. company was sued for recovery of losses and dam-
ages allegedly suffered from a breach of contract for dredging at the port of
Salina Cruz.47 The Mexican government challenged the Commission's
jurisdiction, claiming that the parties' contract included a Calvo clause
which "deprives the party subscribing [to] said Clause of the right to sub-
mit any claims connected with his contract to an international commis-
sion."48 On this ground, the Commission sustained the Mexican
40. BoRcHARD, supra note 30, at 809.
41. Id. at 795.
42. Id. at 793.
43. North American Dredging Co. of Texas (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 4 Rev.
Int'l Arb. Awards 26 (1926).
44. SHEA, supra note 10, at 196.
45. Id. at 195-96.
46. North American Dredging Co., 4 Rev. Int'l Arb. Awards at 26 (1926). The deci-
sion did not state that all Calvo clauses were valid in any situation. The Commission
declared that alternative international remedies would remain available to a foreigner
because to do otherwise would constitute a denial of justice. Id. at 25. In later deci-
sions, however, the Commission did state that to constitute a denial of justice, the inter-
est involved would have to be substantial and the conduct of the state "grave." See, e.g.,
El Oro Mining and Railroad Co., 5 Rev. Int'l Arb. Awards 191 (1931).
47. North American Dredging Co., 4 Rev. hn'l Arb. Awards at 26.
48. Id. at 27. The Calvo clause read:
The contractor and all persons who, as employees or in any other capacity, may
be engaged in the execution of the work under this contract either directly or
indirectly, shall be considered as Mexicans in all matters, within the Republic of
Mexico, concerning the execution of such work and the fulfillment of this con-
tract. They shall not claim, nor shall they have, with regard to the interests and
Cornell International Law Journal
government's motion for dismissal of the claim.49
The Commission held that the contract's Calvo clause precluded the
U.S. company involved from requesting diplomatic protection and required
it to first seek relief in local courts.50 The Commission's decision did not,
however, represent a sweeping endorsement of Calvo clauses in general.
The Commission stated that "it is quite possible to recognize as valid some
forms of waiving the right of foreign protection without thereby recogniz-
ing as valid and lawful every form of doing so."5 1 The Commission also
stated that a Calvo clause in a contract would not preclude diplomatic
intervention in the event of a violation of international law.5 2
Subsequent arbitral decisions followed the reasoning of North Ameri-
can Dredging Co. and held that a foreign investor's contractual waiver of
diplomatic protection would be effective unless it resulted in a "denial of
justice."53 In these decisions, the Commission limited the circumstances
in which a "denial of justice" would be found to those instances where the
interest involved was substantial and the conduct of the state grave.54
3. The Calvo Doctrine and Foreign Policy
Since North American Dredging Co., the insertion of a "Calvo clause" in
contracts between States and foreign investors has achieved partial interna-
tional acceptance on the theory that a voluntary waiver of diplomatic pro-
tection is binding upon a foreign investor, although a foreign investor's
home state may still choose to ignore his waiver. Today, many Latin Ameri-
can countries continue to subject their investment contracts to Calvo
clauses.55
Calvo clause principles continue to form conspicuous parts of docu-
ments that are considered the cornerstones of hemispheric foreign pol-
the business connected with this contract, any other rights or means to enforce
the same than those granted by the laws of the Republic to Mexicans, nor shall
they enjoy any other rights than those established in favor of Mexicans. They
are consequently deprived of any rights as aliens, and under no conditions shall
the intervention of foreign diplomatic agents be permitted, in any matter related
to this contract.
Id. at 26-27.
49. Id. at 26.
50. Id. at 30.
51. Id. at 28.
52. Id. at 29.
53. See e.g., Interoceanic Railway Co. of Mexico, 6 Annual Digest 199 (1931-32); El
Oro Mining and Railroad Co., 5 Rev. Int'l Arb. Awards at 191.
54. Id. Donald Shea argues that Latin-American countries have tried to define
"denial of justice" even more narrowly:
[These countries] have tried to define the term unilaterally so as to cover only
outrageous derelictions by the courts when they refuse access to the judicial
remedies, when they refuse to render a decision, or when they flagrantly deny
due process of law. This restricted procedural definition of the term, which
would virtually exclude interposition, has not won wide acceptance by foreign
offices, courts, or the leading publicists of the world.
SHEA, supra note 10, at 115.
55. Jova, supra note 37, at 12.
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icy.56 These principles are embodied in the constitutions and statutes of
Latin American countries as well as in treaties concluded among them.57
They are also contained in recent inter-American instruments such as the
1976 opinion of Transnational Enterprises of the Inter-American Juridical
Committee58 and international resolutions such as the 1974 U.N. Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS). 59
II. ANCOM and the Calvo Doctrine
A. Origins and Organization of ANCOM
In 1969, the governments of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru
signed the Cartagena Agreement, which created the Andean Common Mar-
ket (ANCOM). 60 Venezuela did not join ANCOM until 1973, and Chile
56. See, e.g., Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, arts. 12,
15, 16, 2 U.S.T. 2416, 119 U.N.T.S. 48, amended by 21 U.S.T. 658, 721 U.N.T.S. 324.
The Charter established the Organization of American States as part of an effort of Latin
American nations and the United States to build a more formal structure for their rela-
tions with each other. Jova, supra note 37, at 14. Certain Charter provisions addressed
the role of a foreign private investor in the region's development and the interests of the
developing countries in such investment activities. Id.
57. Jova, supra note 37, at 12. For examples of constitutional provisions, see Bouv-
IAN CoNsTITuTiON, translated in CONsITunONS OF THE CoUtnrIs OF TE.WoRLD, Release
92-4 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992); VmmzumEAN CoNs-TTnION,
translated in CONsrrrtmoNs OF THE CoumuaW.s OF -rHm WOmu (Albert P. Blaustein &
Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1983 & Supp. 1994).
58. Work Accomplished by the Inter-American Juridical Committee During Its Regular
Meeting Held from January 12 to February 13, 1976, at 147, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.Q/
IV.12CJI-27 (May 1976). The Committee stated that:
Transnational enterprises and the corporations comprising them are not per-
sons under international law and lack jus standi in international courts. The
American states should abstain from adhering to conventions which in any way
grant those enterprises or the corporations comprising them direct access to
international courts, including arbitration courts, because this would justifiably
place transnational enterprises in an advantageous position over national enter-
prises. The questions posed by transnational enterprises could eventually be
heard by international courts through agreements entered into by the states to
resolve their disputes. International courts receive their competence by express
consent of the states.
Id.
59. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 52, U.N.Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter CERDS]. Article
2(2)(c) of the Charter provides that:
[Each State has the right to] nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of
foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the
State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regula-
tions and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case
where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be set-
ded under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals,
unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peace-
ful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in
accordance with the principle of free choice of means.
Id. art. 2(2)(c). See also discussion infra part IV.B.
60. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, opened for signature May 26,
1969, 8 LL.M. 910 (1969) [hereinafter Cartagena Agreement].
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withdrew in 1976.61 A main purpose of the Cartagena Agreement was to
adopt a common strategy for economic development based on certain
shared goals.62 Specifically, the Agreement called for developing a "coordi-
nated procedure in... development planning... and a harmonization of
... economic and social policies, directed toward future adoption of a con-
certed planning system for the integrated development of the area."63 More
importantly, Article 27 of the Agreement mandated a "common system for
treatment of foreign capital."64
Procedurally, the Andean Board and the Andean Commission are the
principal organs of the Andean Agreement 65 and must act in the collective
interest of all of the members of the Agreement. 66 The Andean Commis-
sion, however, is the "supreme organ of the Agreement, constituted by one
plenipotentiary representative from each of the Member State Govern-
ments."67 The Commission's most significant responsibility is "[tio formu-
late the general policies of the Agreement and to adopt any measures
necessary to achieve its objectives."68 Significantly, Member States must
implement the Commission's measures within six months after the Com-
mission adopts them.69
B. ANCOM's Decision 24
In 1970, the Andean Commission, in an attempt to establish a common
system for the treatment of foreign investment, issued Decision 24, also
known as the Foreign Investment Code (the "Code").70 At the time the
Code was formulated, many Latin American nations were under the influ-
ence of strong protectionist sentiments, sentiments which remained signifi-
cant through the early 1980s. 71
Article 30 of the Code required a foreign direct investor to divest itself
of majority control of an enterprise within fifteen or twenty years.72 Fur-
61. Jova, supra note 37, at note 41.
62. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 60, art. 25.
63. Id. art. 26.
64. Id. art. 27.
65. Id. art. 5.
66. Id. arts. 13, 14.
67. Id. art. 6.
68. Id. art. 7(a).
69. Id. art. 27.
70. Decision 24 of Dec. 31, 1970, Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, revised
by Decisions 37, 37-A, 70, 103 & 109, 16 I.L.M. 138 (1977) [hereinafter Decision 24].
71. In many cases this state of affairs can be traced to the debt crises many Latin
American countries experienced. Most, if not all, of these countries' troubled loans
came from more developed North American and European countries. See generally
Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Decision 24, Mexicanization, and the New International Economic
Order: The Anatomy of Disincentive, TEx. INTL'. J. 289 (1978). For a detailed discussion
of the restrictions that Latin American countries placed on foreign investment and trade,
see Mark Baker & Mark Holmes, An Analysis of Latin American Foreign Investment Law:
Proposals for Striking a Balance Between Foreign Investment and Political Stability, 23 U.
MtAm INra-AM. L. Rnv. 1, 2-14 (1991).
72. Decision 24, supra note 70, art. 30. Specifically, Article 30 states that:
Foreign enterprises that may be established in the territory of any Member
Country ... shall agree, in representation of their shareholders, to place on sale
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thermore, Article 37 limited the amount of profits that a foreign investor
may repatriate to twenty percent of his capital investment annually.73
Other restrictive provisions of the Code included: (1) a limitation on for-
eign investors' access to domestic credit;74 (2) a restriction on a foreign
investor's ability to buy a failing nationally owned business if no other
buyer was found;75 and (3) a prohibition of clauses in investment agree-
ments calling for subrogation of international arbitration.76
Article 50 of the Code introduced the Calvo Doctrine's national treat-
ment standard into law. It prevented ANCOM members from "grant[ing]
to foreign investors any treatment more favorable than that granted to
national investors."77 Article 51 of Decision 24 gave voice to the Calvo
Doctrine's prohibition against diplomatic intervention. It provided that "in
no instrument relating to investments or the transfer of technology shall
there be clauses that remove possible conflicts or controversies from the
national jurisdiction and competence of the recipient country or allow the
subrogation by States to the rights and actions of their national inves-
tors."78 This rigid provision denied foreign investors the right to have their
disputes settled by arbitration or other forms of diplomatic intervention.
C. ANCOM's Decision 220
In 1987, the Andean Commission repealed Decision 24 and replaced it
with Decision 220.79 The Commission reformulated its national treatment
standard in Article 33, which provided that "Member Countries [could]
not grant foreign investors a more favorable treatment than that granted to
national investors."80 In effect, this provision is identical to Article 50 of
Decision 24. Both prohibit a Member Country from treating a foreign
investor better than its own nationals.
Regarding dispute settlement, Decision 220 somewhat mitigates the
Calvo Doctrine prohibition on diplomatic intervention. Under Article 34,
"[flor the settlement of disputes or conflicts deriving from direct foreign
investments or from the transfer of foreign technology, Member Countries
shall apply the provisions established in their local legislation."81 Thus,
unlike Article 50 of Decision 24, each Member Country could indepen-
dently decide the extent of foreign investor access to arbitration or diplo-
for purchase by national investors, gradually and progressively ... the percent-
age of their shares, participation or rights necessary for the transformation of
such enterprises into mixed enterprises, within a period which may not exceed
15 years in Colombia, Chile, and Peru, and 20 years in Bolivia and Ecuador.
Id.
73. Id. art. 37.
74. Id. art. 17.
75. Id. art. 3.
76. Id. art. 51.
77. Id. art. 50.
78. Id. art. 51.
79. Decision 220 of May 11, 1987, Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, 27
I.L.M. 974 (1988) [hereinafter Decision 220] (replacing Decision 24).
80. Id. art. 33.
81. Id. art. 34.
Cornell International Law Journal
matic intervention. Without this grant of independence, Article 27 of the
Cartagena Agreement would require ANCOM members to implement Com-
mission measures covering the treatment of foreign capital. 82 However,
this latter tenet of the Calvo Doctrine remains unimportant even after the
enactment of Decision 220 because the legislation enacted by most
ANCOM members prohibits arbitration and diplomatic intervention.83
D. ANCOM's Decision 291
In 1991, the Andean Commission repealed Decision 220 and replaced it
with Decision 291,84 arguably the most lenient of the three Decisions.
Unlike the "bright line" national treatment provisions contained in the pre-
vious Decisions, Decision 291 grants individual Member Countries the
right to determine how foreign investors will be treated in their respective
legal systems.85 This freedom of choice is evident in Article 2, which pro-
vides that "[oreign investors shall have the same rights and obligations as
pertain to national investors, except as otherwise provided in the legisla-
tion of each Member Country." 86
Article 10 of Decision 291, which covers dispute settlement provi-
sions, conforms with Article 34 of Decision 220. Regarding a foreign inves-
tors right to diplomatic protection, Article 10 states that, "[t]he Member
Countries shall apply that provided in their domestic legislation with
respect to the solution of controversies or conflicts deriving from direct
foreign investment or subregional investment or the transfer of foreign
technology." 87 Thus, the greater discretion given to individual ANCOM
members regarding the settlement of investment disputes parallels the
greater discretion that they possess in determining the standard of treat-
ment for foreign investors.
Although each successive decision was less draconian in its treatment
of foreign capital, each also contains aspects of the Calvo Doctrine's two
central tenets, the national treatment standard and the prohibition against
diplomatic intervention. More importantly, components of these two prin-
ciples are contained in current Decision 291.88 Consequently, the delega-
tion of decision-making power to Member Countries has not eliminated the
Calvo Doctrine from relevance.
III. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
Although the international community, including the World Bank, consid-
ered creating a multilateral investment insurance agency in the late
82. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 60, art. 27.
83. See infra part IV.C.
84. Decision 291 of Mar. 21, 1991, Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, 30
LL.M. 1283 (1991) [hereinafter Decision 291] (replacing Decision 220).
85. Id. art. 2.
86. Id.
87. Id. art. 10.
88. Id. arts. 2, 10.
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1950s,89 no such agency existed until 1981 when World Bank officers pro-
posed a World Bank-controlled investment guarantee agency.90 During the
intervening period, both national governments and private agencies cre-
ated various organizations with the purpose of improving the investment
climate in less developed countries. 91 These organizations included the
World Bank-sponsored International Finance Company (IFC), specializing
in the promotion and financing of the private sector,92 and the Interna-
tional Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 93 In addi-
tion, corporations and governments created national and private
investment insurance programs such as the U.S. Overseas Private Insur-
ance Corporation (OPIC). 9 4
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency entered into force on
April 12, 1988 after ratification by the United States and the United King-
dom.95 The Agency's basic objective is to "enhance the flow to developing
countries of capital and technology for productive purposes under condi-
tions consistent with their development needs, policies and objectives, on
the basis of fair and stable standards for the treatment of foreign invest-
ment."9 6 To meet these objectives, the Agency "issue[s] guarantees against
non-commercial risks in respect of investments in a member country
89. THEODOR MERON, INVESTMENT INSURANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 31 (1976).
90. Address of World Bank President A.W. Clausen, 1981 Joint Annual Meetings of
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund Summary Proceedings (1982).
91. See, e.g., Report of the Study Group for the Development of Africa, Eur. Consult.
Ass'n, at 22, 20th Sess., Doc. No. 701 (1957); Report on an Investment Statute and a
Guarantee Fund Against Political Risk, Eur. Consult. Ass'n, at 22, 20th Sess., Doc. No.
1027 (1959); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERc:, STATMvENTS AND RESOLUTIONS 1963-
65, at 11 (1965). For a general discussion of international investment guarantee propos-
als, see William Conant Brewer, Jr., The Proposalfor Investment Guarantees by an Interna-
tional Agency, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (1964).
92. Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, opened for signa-
ture May 25, 1955, arts. I, 11(2), 7 U.S.T. 2197, 264 U.N.T.S. 117.
93. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.LA.S.
No. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. ICSID had its roots in a study initiated by the
World Bank in 1962. Responding to what it felt were drawbacks in foreign investment
dispute settlement mechanisms of the time as well as in the hopes of encouraging for-
eign investment in less developed countries, the World Bank study examined the feasi-
bility of establishing an institution to facilitate the settlement of international disputes
through arbitration. See Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 4 IL.M.
524, c 12 (1965). The ICSID Convention was submitted for ratification in March 1965
and entered into force on October 14, 1966 after ratification by twenty countries. ICSID
Convention, supra, art. 68(2). At this time, every Latin American nation voted against
ratifying the ICSID Convention. Id.
94. OPIC was authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969. Foreign Assistance
Act of 1969, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200a (1994). OPIC, a U.S. government corporation, is
run by a board of directors hailing both from the government and private sector.
95. While some countries had ratified the MIGA Convention two years earlier, the
Convention had to pass certain hurdles before it could be enacted. Specifically, the
MIGA Convention required ratification by at least five "Category One" countries (devel-
oped countries) and at least fifteen "Category Two" countries. MIGA Convention, supra
note 3, art. 61(b).
96. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, pmbl.
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which flow from other member countries" and "carr[ies] out ... comple-
mentary activities to promote the flow of investments to and among devel-
oping member countries."97
A. Ownership and Voting Arrangements
The MIGA Convention provides that all Member Countries will receive
equal voting power when all members of the World Bank become members
of MIGA.98 Until that time, signatories to the MIGA Convention are
divided into two categories, developed and developing countries.99 For the
first three years after MIGA entered into force, each category of countries
was entitled to additional votes in order to maintain a minimum forty per-
cent of the total voting power. 100 The Convention provided for a realloca-
tion of shares after the first three years to ensure parity before additional
countries could join.101 MIGA commentators hope that the Convention's
emphasis on voting power parity will be a strong incentive for ratification
by developing countries. 10 2
B. Covered Risks and Eligible Investments and Investors
The Convention expressly covers four broad categories of non-commercial
risk: (1) currency transfer risk; (2) the risk of expropriation or similar
measures; 10 3 (3) breach of contract risk;10 4 and (4) the risk of war or other
civil disturbance. 10 5 Additionally, "upon the joint application of the inves-
tor and [a] host country" the Agency's Board of Directors can extend cover-
age to non-commercial risks other than those covered by the four
97. Id. art. 2(a), (b).
98. Id. art. 39(a), (b). The rationale for this is that "[t]he voting structure of the
Agency reflects the view that Category One and Category Two countries have an equal
stake in foreign investment, that cooperation between them is essential, and that both
groups of countries should, when all eligible countries become members, have equal
voting power (50/50)." Commentary on the Convention Establishing the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency, 1 ICSID REv. FOR INv. LJ. 195, 1 63 (1986) [hereinafter
Commentary].
99. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, sched. A.
100. Id. art. 39(b).
101. Id. art. 39(c).
102. Rowat, supra note 6, at 128. "MIGA's voting structure clearly reflects the attempt
to avoid a majority vote for capital exporting countries." Berger, supra note 1, at 24.
"The Convention basically follows the Bretton Woods model of weighted voting, offering
each member country 177 membership votes and one additional vote per share sub-
scribed." Id. To further the goal of parity between countries, "during the critical period
of the first three years, each group is assured a minimum of 40 percent of total voting
power by allocation of supplementary voting shares as necessary." Id. at 25.
103. This provision does cover "measures attributable to the host government such as
nationalization, confiscation, sequestration, seizure, attachment and freezing of assets."
Commentary, supra note 98, '1 14. This provision does not cover "[m]easures normally
taken by governments to regulate their economic activities such as taxation, environ-
mental and labor legislation as well as normal measures for the maintenance of public
safety" as long as these measures do not discriminate against the guarantee holder. Id.
104. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, art. 11(a)(iii). Coverage under this provision is
predicated on the exhaustion of local remedies in a timely fashion or the lack of enforce-
ability of such a remedy. Id.105. Id. art. ll(a)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv).
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categories above.10 6
In an attempt to "strike a balance between the need to preserve the
Agency's scarce capital to promote flows of direct investment and the need
to assure future flexibility by allowing [the Agency's Board of Directors] to
extend coverage to other types of investments," 1°7 MIGA established broad
and flexible criteria for the eligibility of both investors and investments.
MIGA's initial emphasis is on "equity investment, different forms of equity
investment, and medium- or long-term loans made or guaranteed by own-
ers of equity in the enterprise concerned."' 08 In accord with the goal of
maximum flexibility, however, MIGA's Board, by special majority decision,
may extend coverage to additional forms of investment.1°9 Before an
investment is guaranteed, MIGA must authorize the investment and subject
it to a substantive review." 0
Under Article 13 of the MIGA Convention, an investor must be a
national of a Member Country other than the host country to be eligible to
receive a guarantee. A juridical person, e.g., a corporate entity, is eligible
provided that
[it] is incorporated and has its principal place of business in a member or'
the majority of its capital is owned by a member or members or nationals
thereof, provided that such member is not the host country in any of the
above cases ... and such juridical person ... operates on a commercial
basis. 1 '
Article 13 does, however, provide for one exception. Where a natural per-
son is a national of the host country or a juridical person is incorporated in
a host country, the Agency can grant eligibility by a special majority vote
upon a joint application of the investor and the host country.'1 2 This
exception is thought to be "consistent with the Agency's central objective of
channelling the flow of investment to developing countries, some of which
now have nationals living abroad with considerable off-shore funds."" 3
106. Id. art. 11(b).
107. Commentary, supra note 98, cl 19.
108. Id. According to Mr. Shihata, this language would include investments such as
"various forms of industrial cooperation such as management and service contracts,
licensing and franchising agreements, turnkey contracts as well as arrangements con-
cerning the transfer of technology and know-how where the investor assumes a stake in
the performance of the venture." Shihata, supra note 4, at 15.
109. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, art. 12(b).
110. Id. art. 12(d)(i)-(iv). Specifically, the article provides that before guaranteeing an
investment, MIGA shall satisfy itself as to:
(i) the economic soundness of the investment and its contribution to the devel-
opment of the host country;
(ii) compliance of the investment with the host country's laws and regulations;
(iii) consistency of the investment with the declared development objectives and
priorities of the host country; and
(iv) the investment conditions in the host country, including the availability of
fair and equitable treatment and legal protection for the investment.
Id.
112. Id. art. 13(c).
113. Commentary, supra note 98, cl 23.
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C. Dispute Settlement Provisions
Of particular importance to Latin American countries considering mem-
bership in MIGA is the Convention's dispute settlement provisions. For
most disputes, the MIGA Convention establishes a framework of negotia-
tions and conciliation, and if this fails, subsequent arbitration under
ICSID-like rules. 114 The Convention, however, allows members to choose
alternative dispute settlement mechanisms provided that MIGA's Board of
Directors approves the alternative by a special majority prior to the com-
mencement of coverage in the concerned member's territory.1 1 5 These
agreements would override the Convention-provided dispute settlement
mechanisms. 1 16
The MIGA Convention anticipates four different types of disputes that
would require established settlement procedures:
(a) disputes over interpretation and application of the Convention
between a member and the Agency or among members;
(b) guarantee or reinsurance contract disputes between the Agency
and another party;
(c) where the Agency is acting as subrogee of an investor in a dispute
with another member; and
(d) disputes other than those under (a), (b), or (c) between the
Agency and a member or former member.117
The MIGA Convention mandates resolution mechanisms for each type
of dispute. The Convention gives MIGA's Board of Directors the responsi-
bility of settling disputes over the Convention's interpretation and applica-
tion.1" 8 Guarantee or reinsurance contract disputes between MIGA and an
insured member are to be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
rules agreed upon in the parties' contract. 1 9 More importantly, MIGA
envisages that standard contract guarantees will provide for arbitration
under ICSID-like rules.
In the event that MIGA pays a claim, the Agency "shall be subrogated
to such rights or claims related to the guaranteed investment as the holder
of a guarantee may have had against the host country."120 Under Article
114. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, Annex II, arts. 3, 4.
115. Id. Annex II, arts. 2, 3(a), 3(b), 4(e).
116. Id. Additionally, most MIGA proponents argue that these agreements, if they are
to be justified at all, have to provide for different methods which are consistent with the
constitutional requirements of the country concerned.
117. Commentary, supra note 98, 11 76(a)-(d).
118. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, art. 56(a). The Board, consisting of no less than
twelve Directors, is appointed by the President of the World Bank, who acts as ex officio
Chairman of the Board. Id. art. 32.
119. Id Annex H, art. 4.
120. Id. art. 18(a). According to Black's Law Dictionary,
[s]ubrogation denotes the exchange of a third person who has paid a debt in the
place of the creditor to whom he had paid it, so that he may exercise against the
debtor all the rights which the creditor, if unpaid. Insurance companies, guar-
antors and bonding companies generally have the right to step into the shoes of
the party whom they compensate and sue any party whom the compensated
party could have sued.
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57 of the Convention, the Agency would, in the end, have recourse to inter-
national arbitration to enforce its subrogated rights against the host
country. 121
IV. The Dependency Theory, the Calvo Doctrine, and Latin America
MIGA proponents argue that since the formulation of the Calvo Doctrine,
new and significant developments have occurred in the area of interna-
tional investment law that make the doctrine irrelevant. 122 Focusing on
the economies of Latin American countries, these commentators argue that
the sheer economic need for foreign investment in Latin American coun-
tries reduces any adherence to Calvo Doctrine principles to a mere kind of
lipservice. 123
By focusing only on an economic cost-benefit analysis, however, MIGA
proponents ignore the socio-political context which makes the Calvo Doc-
trine influential even today in many Latin American countries. There is an
alternative view that purely economic and market conditions are not the
only relevant factors in the investment bargaining process between investor
and developing country.124 According to one view, "the inevitable frictions
that occur when differing cultures, value systems, and standards of living
meet under competitive circumstances" also form a part of the investment
bargain and cannot be ignored by either side. 125 Furthermore, "[tihese fac-
tors, no matter how irrelevant or 'political' they may seem in strict eco-
nomic terms, directly influence the terms of the investment bargain by
dampening incentives on one side or the other."126
Calvo principles are especially important in this context. The Calvo
Doctrine informs the absolutely necessary political considerations that go
into any foreign direct investment project. The continued reliance of Latin
American countries on Calvo-influenced investment policies can be seen in
the "dependency theory" view of economic development, resolutions such
as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS), 127 and
associations such as ANCOM. Thus, the first argument advanced by MIGA
proponents, that the Calvo Doctrine is irrelevant, is misguided.
A. The Dependency Theory and the Calvo Doctrine
Calvo principles are alive and well in the basic tenets of the dependency
theory. Formulated by Latin American political scientists, the theory's
basic argument is that the ultimate goal of Latin America is to improve the
standard of living and social well-being of its people through industrializa-
BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 995 (6th ed. 1991).
121. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, art. 57(b).
122. Shihata, supra note 4, at 3-4.
123. Id. at 3.
124. Jova, supra note 37, at 7. See also JAMES COcKCROFr Er AL, DEPENDENcE AND
UNDEmRD ELOPMENT (1972).
125. Jova, supra note 37, at 7.
126. Id.
127. CERDS, supra note 59.
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tion.12 8 However, this goal can be achieved only if the Latin American
economies acquire enough strength to compete autonomously as export-
ers. 129 Until they are able to do so, Latin American countries will remain
"dependent on economic forces outside their control." 130
The dependency theorists believe that although foreign private invest-
ment helped to raise the level of industrialization in Latin America, it has
not served the other goals stated above.1 3 1 Thus, "Latin American coun-
tries remain dependent on foreign corporations and capital-exporting
countries to sustain [future] development and [are] thus vulnerable to the
negative, anti-developmental aspects of [foreigners'] roles in their econo-
mies."13 2 These theorists also assert that since the current situation bene-
fits the industrialized countries they are unlikely to do anything to bring
about real development in Latin America.133
The Calvo Doctrine is an important part of the dependency theory's
view of development. Calvo principles provide a framework for depen-
dency theorists on which rests their vision of how foreign investment
should fit into their economies. Latin American dependency theorists con-
strue the role of foreign investment in terms of how it should fit into their
municipal standards of development. This construction is quite similar to
how the Calvo Doctrine construes standards of legal treatment in munici-
pal terms.
B. CERDS and the Calvo Doctrine
Calvo principles also played a role in the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States initiative. 134 The rationale underlying CERDS was that the
wealthier nations, who seemed unwilling or unable to assist poorer nations
in the southern half of the globe, controlled most of the financial institu-
tions which affected international trade.1 35 Charter proponents saw the
economic gap between the richer and poorer nations grow in conjunction
128. Jova, supra note 37, at 16.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. These negative aspects of foreign investment include:(i) the possibility that the foreign investor will outperform and possibly displace
the national investor;(ii) local firms, not being as solid a credit risk as a large foreign firm, will not be
able to expand or diversify its operations to the same extent as the foreign firm;(iii) the foreign firm has an unequal bargaining position in that it can always
"pack-up" and go home, taking with it technology and know how. This fact
inhibits negotiation and true cooperation in development efforts; and(iv) possible negative effect on the balance of payments attendant upon depen-
dency and that this effect is heightened by foreign investments in the manufac-
turing sector.
Id. at 16-17.
133. Jova, supra note 37, at 17.
134. Richard Lillich, The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad: An Elementary
Principle of International Law Under Attack, 69 Am. J. INT'rL L. 359, 361-62 (1975).
135. Andres Rozental, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the New
International Economic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 309, 317 (1976).
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with what they felt were trade imbalances and believed that CERDS could
provide "a new and more equitable treatment in development
assistance."136
The drafters intended to set out the rights and duties of states which
should become part of international law. 137 The richer nations mustered
so much resistance, however, that a charter containing legally binding
principles was impossible to achieve. 138 Thus, while the resulting General
Assembly resolution was not binding under international law, it reflected
the expectations of a large portion of the international community and was
unanimously endorsed by all Latin American countries.139
The Charter itself sought to globalize the Calvo Doctrine. 140 This goal
is illustrated by Article 2 of the Charter. 141 Article 2 rejects any right of a
foreign investor to diplomatic protection.142 Furthermore, the Charter pro-
vides that in cases of expropriation of foreign owned property, the expro-
priating state has only a duty to pay appropriate compensation, "taking
into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances [it]
considers pertinent."'143 Finally, under the Charter all controversies are to
be resolved exclusively within the municipal courts of the taking states
unless otherwise agreed by the parties.144 Thus, the Charter clearly enun-
ciated the Calvo Doctrine's national treatment standard and prohibition
against diplomatic protection. The Charter and its Calvo principles were
overwhelmingly endorsed by less developed countries who firmly believed
in having Calvo-influenced legal responses available to them in the event of
an investment dispute. 145
C. ANCOM and the Calvo Doctrine
Influenced by the dependency theory, Latin American countries confront
potential investors with an expanding idea of how foreign investments
should fit into their national economic development plans. 146 This shift in
attitude exists in most Latin American countries, particularly the regional
association of South American states known as ANCOM. Underlying
ANCOM's foundation is the belief that Latin American countries should
136. Id. at 312.
137. Id. at 314-15.
138. Gillian White, A New International Economic Order, 16 VA. J. INr'L L. 323, 330
(1976).
139. Id.
140. Lillich, supra note 134, at 361.
141. CERDS, supra note 59, art. 2.
142. Id.
143. Id. art. 2(2)(c).
144. Id. art. 2. Critics of CERDS were only too aware of where its ideas originated.
Lillich noted that Latin American efforts on the Charter were "no more than a thinly-
disguised attempt to endow the Calvo Doctrine... with limited international status.
This development, which would immunize states from potential international responsi-
bility by denying claimants the right to seek the diplomatic protection of their states, is
as unnecessary as it is unfortunate." Lillich, supra note 134, at 361.
145. Rozental, supra note 135, at 309.
146. See Dale B. Furnish, The Andean Common Market's Common Regime for Foreign
Investments, 5 VANI. J. TaANSNAT'L L. 313, 317-21 (1972).
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formulate their own detailed, positive plan for developing an industrialized
society. 147 The influence of the dependency theory, and its embodiment
in the Calvo Doctrine provisions of ANCOM decisions, clearly show that
non-economic factors influence Latin American deliberations on foreign
investment in their respective countries.
1. Overview
The repeal of ANCOM's rigid Decisions 24 and 220 may be cited as evi-
dence that the Calvo Doctrine's grip on Latin American foreign investment
laws is loosening. However, an examination of Decision 291, which
replaced Decisions 24 and 220, reveals that Calvo principles are still avail-
able to Member States. 148 Article 2 of Decision 291 shows the continuing
influence of the Calvo Doctrine's national treatment standard by providing
that "foreign investors shall have the same rights and obligations as pertain
to national investors, except as otherwise provided in the legislation of
each Member Country."14 9 The only difference is that the use of the
national treatment standard is now determined at the individual state level
rather than being dictated by ANCOM.
Furthermore, regarding the settlement of investment disputes, the
Calvo principle against diplomatic intervention also survived in Article 10
of Decision 291.150 Although not as inflexible as Article 51 of Decision 24,
which prohibited any "clauses that remove possible conflicts from the
national jurisdiction and competence of the recipient country or allow the
subrogation by States to the rights and actions of their national inves-
tors," 15 1 Decision 291 may still have ramifications for the uninformed for-
eign investor. As with the national treatment standard, the origin of the
diplomatic intervention provisions has merely been shifted to individual
Member Countries. An examination of two representative ANCOM Mem-
ber Countries, Bolivia and Peru, clearly shows the continuing strength of
Calvo clause principles in Latin America.
2. Bolivia
National treatment standard principles are evident in Article 2 of the Boliv-
ian Foreign Investment Law, which states that, "except where otherwise
established by law, foreign investors and the entities or companies in
which they take part have the same rights, duties and guarantees that the
laws and regulations give to national investors."1 5 2 The significance of the
national treatment standard is further emphasized in Article 3, which pro-
vides that "[n]either Contracting Party shall in its territory subject invest-
ments or returns of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party
147. Id.
148. Decision 291, supra note 84.
149. Id. art. 2.
150. Id. art. 10.
151. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 60, art. 51.
152. Law of Sept. 17, 1990, art. 2, GACErA OncIAL DE BoIVm, No. 1662, Sept. 26,
1990 [hereinafter Bolivian Foreign Investment Law].
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to treatment less favorable than that which it accords to investments or
returns of nationals or companies of any third State."153
Calvo principles related to diplomatic intervention are evident in Arti-
cle 24 of the Bolivian Constitution, which provides that "foreign subjects
and enterprises are subject to Bolivian laws, and in no case may they...
have recourse to diplomatic claims."' 5 4 Thus, unless permitted by some
other law, foreigners may not seek diplomatic protection.' 55
3. Peru
As in Bolivia, the Calvo Doctrine national treatment standard manifests
itself in Peruvian laws. The national treatment standard ideal is included
in Article 2 of Decree 662 of 1991, which provides that, except for constitu-
tional limitations, foreign investors have rights and obligations equal to
those of national investors.15 6
With respect to diplomatic intervention, neither Peru's Constitution
nor its Foreign Investment Law explicitly address a foreigner's right to dip-
lomatic protection.15 7 However, a presumption does exist in favor of set-
tling investment disputes before Peruvian courts.158 To this end, Peruvian
law provides that "[the] State may agree to submit disputes arising from
stability agreements to Arbitration Courts as foreseen in international trea-
ties of which Peru is a party."15 9 There is no guarantee, however, that a
foreign investor will be able to have his dispute heard by an international
arbitration panel.
V. The Calvo Doctrine's Ramifications for MIGA
If, as argued above, the Calvo Doctrine remains an important aspect of
Latin America's legal treatment of foreign investment, there are important
implications for MIGA's role in Latin American countries. Calvo principles
may prevent some Latin American countries from becoming signatories of
MIGA. For Latin American countries that do become signatories of the
MIGA Convention, Calvo Doctrine principles in their legislation or govern-
ment contracts may affect MIGA's ability to attain its goal of increasing
foreign direct investment flows to these countries. MIGA proponents
argue, however, that the MIGA Convention provisions offer benefits similar
to, if not better than, those offered by the Calvo Doctrine, thus encouraging
153. Id. art. 3.
154. BouvLAN CONST., supra note 57, art. 24.
155. Id.
156. Legis. Decree 662, art. 2, EL PERuANo, Sept. 2, 1991 [hereinafter Legislative
Decree 662].
157. PmtuvAN CoNsrImON, translated in CONSTITUtIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (Albert Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1987); Legislative Decree 662, supra
note 156.
158. Legislative Decree 662, supra note 156, art. 16.
159. Id.
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Latin, American countries to become members of MIGA.1 60 Even if this
assertion is correct, these provisions may work against MIGA's goal of
encouraging the flow of foreign direct investment to Latin America.
In the following section, this Note first argues that the Calvo Doc-
trine's non-economic considerations, as they appear in the dependency
theory, may keep many Latin American countries from signing the MIGA
Convention. Next, this Note examines the effect of specific MIGA provi-
sions as either hindrances or incentives in MIGA's recruitment of Latin
American countries. The Note concludes that MIGA incentives may have a
negative impact on MIGA's attempt to encourage foreign direct investment
in Latin America.
A. The Impact of the Dependency Theory on MIGA
MIGA promoters assert that Latin American countries' desire for foreign
investment outweighs all other considerations. 16 1 However, as the depen-
dency theory illustrates, significant non-economic factors may play a role
in Latin America's treatment of foreign direct investment. As one scholar
stated, "purely economic factors and market conditions are not the only
[factors] that enter the bargaining game between investor and developing
country." 16 2 To this end,
[wihile varying in their approaches and aggressiveness, Latin American
countries have achieved an uncommon harmony in terms of basic goals and
strategies: all want industrialization as a basis for economic growth; all want
a determining voice in their design of their economic futures; and none want
"dependency" upon the developed nations.16 3 (emphasis added)
Promoters of MIGA discount the dependency theory and Calvo principles,
stating that the classification of countries which underpins these princi-
ples is no longer relevant. 16 4 Although "foreign direct investments still
originate mainly in the U.S. and Europe," the promoters believe that other
factors mitigate this situation.165
One need only examine the actual MIGA Convention provisions to see
that the promoters' logic is belied by the very Convention they created.
First, the MIGA Convention categorizes Member Countries (and potential
Member Countries) for voting purposes on a basis very similar to the sup-
160. Shihata, supra note 4, at 24-25. See also Richard B. Alsop, The World Bank's
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 25 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 101 (1989). Alsop
states that
Latin American states need not avoid MIGA on the basis of the Calvo Doctrine.
ICSID's provisions on the exhaustion of local remedies, the application of
domestic laws, and diplomatic protection offer protection for the host country
unequalled even by a wider interpretation of the Calvo clause.
Id. at 133. MIGA provides many of the same protections.
161. Shihata, supra note 4, at 24-25.
162. Jova, supra note 37, at 7.
163. Id. at 5.
164. Shihata, supra note 4, at 3-4.
165. Id. at 4.
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posedly "non-relevant" developing and developed country classification.166
Furthermore, the voting mechanics based on the Convention's categoriza-
tion reflect the MIGA promoters' concern of avoiding an appearance of ine-
quality.' 67 Thus, the very classification of countries which MIGA
promoters argue is dead is very much alive in the MIGA Convention itself.
Indeed, this classification is at the heart of the Convention.
MIGA promoters also assert that the current desire in Latin American
countries for foreign direct investment proves that non-economic, "political
considerations" such as the Calvo Doctrine are overvalued. 168 This posi-
tion also is supported by faulty logic. It implies that today's status quo is
tomorrow's economic reality. This has never been the case and is certainly
not the case in Latin America. Throughout history, dramatic swings
between boom and bust have characterized Latin American economies. 169
Thus, while MIGA promoters base their assertions on the current eagerness
of Latin American governments to attract foreign direct investment, there is
no guarantee that this eagerness will last forever. Moreover, if, as is argued
in this Note, Calvo Doctrine principles are still contained in Latin Ameri-
can constitutions, legislation, and government contracts, the climate for
foreign direct investment in the future may be much less friendly.
The continuing presence of Calvo Doctrine principles in Latin
America leaves the door open for currently disfavored "non-economic" con-
siderations to come into play. MIGA promoters may argue that possible
adverse effects and publicity stemming from negative actions a Latin Amer-
ican country might take are adequate protection for this risk. In response,
one need only look at past expropriations of foreign investor property and
other adverse actions taken against foreign investments to realize that many
investors are forgetful (a forgetfulness many times induced by the promise
of high investment returns).
B. MIGA Provisions as Hindrances to Latin American Ratification
Latin American countries historically have been hostile toward the ideas of
subrogation 170 and arbitration as they apply to foreign direct investment
disputes. 171 This hostility stems from the belief that subrogation and arbi-
tration give foreigners access to diplomatic protection not available to a
166. See MIGA Convention, supra note 3, sched. A. Member Countries are divided
into two categories for voting purposes. Category One countries include the European
countries, North American countries, Australia, and South Africa. Category Two coun-
tries include Caribbean countries, Latin American countries, and African countries. Id.
167. Id. cmt. 63. Under the Convention, both home and host countries will receive
equal voting power when all World Bank members become MIGA members. Id. art.
39(a). During MIGA's first three years, Category Two nations would be guaranteed forty
percent of the total votes. Id. arts. 3(d), 39(b), 39(d). One commentator expressly noted
that a significant rationale for these MIGA voting procedures was to "provid[e] a strong
incentive for developing countries to participate." Rowat, supra note 6, at 128.
168. Shihata, supra note 4, at 3.
169. For an informative brief historical overview of Latin American economies and
foreign investment in those economies see Jova, supra note 37, at 8-10.
170. Shihata, supra note 4, at 20.
171. Id.
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country's own nationals. 172 To many Latin Americans, this access violates
the equality demanded by the Calvo Doctrine's national treatment stan-
dard.' 73 Thus, for MIGA to enlist Latin American countries as members,
these reservations must be addressed and overcome.
1. MIGA Subrogation Provisions
Under the MIGA Convention, after paying or agreeing to pay an insured
investor's claim, MIGA will succeed to the investor's rights against the host
country. 174 After such subrogation, disputes between MIGA and a host
country may ultimately be submitted to international arbitration. 175
Regarding subrogation, MIGA promoters argue that Latin American states
do not object to the subrogation process in general. Rather, it is only the
subrogation of a sovereign state to the claims of private foreign nationals
that many Latin American countries refuse to recognize. 176 Because MIGA
is not a state, but rather an international agency, this reluctance to accept
subrogation is unfounded.
As proof of this assertion, MIGA proponents point to twenty-eight
executive agreements between the United States and Latin American and
Caribbean countries which recognize the subrogation of the Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation (OPIC) to the rights of certain U.S. inves-
tors.1 7 7 MIGA proponents assert that there is no reason to treat their
international agency any less favorably. 178
This argument, however, is disingenuous. While it is true that Latin
American countries have concluded executive agreements with the United
States containing subrogation provisions, many of these agreements still
contain Calvo Doctrine exclusions and reservations. 179 For example, a
1985 U.S.-Bolivia agreement "provides for appointment of a fiduciary agent
who holds rights or claims for OPIC, instead of OPIC itself, and conditions
arbitration on the exhaustion of appeals and administrative and judicial
remedies available in Bolivia."' 80 Requiring foreign investors to exhaust
local remedies ensures that MIGA's protection of foreign investors may be
limited.' 8 1
172. Baker & Yoder, supra note 8, at 90.
173. Id.
174. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, art. 18(b).
175. Id. Annex II, arts. 2, 3(a), 3(b), 4(e).
176. Shihata, supra note 4, at 19.
177. See, e.g., Agreement Relating to Investment Guarantees, Nov. 26 and 29, 1962,
U.S.-Venez., 474 U.N.T.S. 107; Treaty Concerning the Treatment of Protection of Invest-
ments, Oct. 27, 1982, U.S.-Pan., art. II, 21 I.L.M. 1227.
178. Shihata, supra note 4, at 20.
179. Rowat, supra note 6, at 125. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation func-
tions as an investment guarantee agency focused on United States citizens who invest
abroad. The agency was established by passage of the Overseas Private Investment Cor-
poration Act of 1969, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-99 (1994). For an in-depth discussion of the
origins and role of the OPIC program, see Steven Franklin & Gerald T. West, The Over-
seas Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1978: A Reaffirmation of the Developmen-
tal Role of Investment Insurance, 14 Tax. INT'L UJ. 1 (1979).
180. Berger, supra note 1, at 36 n.149.
181. See, e.g., Agreement on the Guaranty of Private Investments, Dec. 22, 1959, U.S.-
Arg., 12 U.S.T. 955, T.I.A.S. No. 4799.
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2. MIGA Internatiofial Arbitration Provisions
MIGA's international arbitration provisions also implicate Calvo Doctrine
diplomatic intervention principles. MIGA requires that, in the event of a
dispute between MIGA and a host country with respect to MIGA's subro-
gated claim, the parties must first attempt to settle the claim through nego-
tiation.18 2 Failing successful negotiation, Article 57 of the MIGA
Convention requires disputes to be submitted to international arbitration
unless MIGA and the Latin American country agree on an alternative dis-
pute settlement procedure. 183 In the absence of an alternative dispute
mechanism, this provision would violate many Latin American laws, such
as Bolivia's and Peru's prohibitions against, or limitations on, diplomatic
protection.
Arguably, MIGA can overcome these prohibitions under Article 57(b),
which authorizes MIGA to enter into individual agreements establishing
alternative dispute mechanisms with host countries requesting such an
alternative.18 4 However, such agreements must be entered into before
MIGA begins operations in the host country. 185 These agreements would
supersede the dispute settlement procedures provided by the MIGA Con-
vention.18 6 Although this provision may accomplish its goal of encourag-
ing ANCOM Member Countries and other Latin American countries to
sign the MIGA Convention, it will limit MIGA's effectiveness. A country
with foreign investment laws similar to those of Bolivia and Peru could
simply bypass the "depoliticized" MIGA procedures and insist on a dispute
settlement mechanism compatible with Calvo diplomatic intervention prin-
ciples. This alternative dispute mechanism would supplement the MIGA
Convention's requirement that a foreign investor exhaust local remedies.
Through the exercise of this Alternate dispute mechanism option, MIGA
may, prior to undertaking operations in a given country, enter into a bilat-
eral agreement with it, thereby adjusting the dispute settlement mechanism
to the peculiar legal and political situation of such a country. For instance,
it may agree to... exhaust local remedies in the host country as a condition
precedent or an alternative to resorting to arbitration under Annex II to the
Convention. 187
In this type of situation it is difficult to see how MIGA substantively
improves a foreign investor's plight in an investment dispute with a host
country. The Calvo Doctrine's national treatment standard, the bane of
many foreign investors, is specifically allowed for by MIGA. Although
MIGA may refuse to undertake operations in a host country if it is not
satisfied with a proposed alternative dispute settlement mechanism, too
many of these refusals may prevent MIGA from meeting its goal of encour-
aging foreign direct investment flows to Latin America.
182. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, Annex II, art. 2.
183. Id. art. 57(b) and Annex I.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Shihata, supra note 4, at 21.
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Finally, MIGA arbitration provisions create a strong arbitration system
which is modeled on ICSID provisions. 18 8 In particular, Article 4(j) of the
MIGA Convention, like Article 54(1) of ICSID, provides that members must
agree to recognize awards pursuant to arbitration and enforce them within
their territories as if they were final judgments of their domestic courts.18 9
In addition, like ICSID, MIGA has provisions which prevent a party from
frustrating arbitration proceedings by failing to select arbitrators.19 0
While a strong arbitration provision modeled on ICSID may be attrac-
tive to a foreign investor, one needs only look at Latin American countries'
relations with ICSID to realize that such a provision may be very unattrac-
tive to Latin America. The ICSID Convention was not ratified by a single
Latin American country at its signing in 1964.191 This lack of support is
not surprising because the very purpose of ICSID conflicts with Calvo Doc-
trine prohibitions on the international arbitration of foreign investment
disputes. Latin America's reluctance to ratify the ICSID Convention is still
present today, with only slow movement toward ratification by some Latin
American countries. 19 2 Thus, a MIGA arbitration mechanism based on
ICSID is unlikely to convince Latin American countries to become mem-
bers of MIGA.
C. MIGA Provisions as Incentives for Latin American Ratification
MIGA's problems in Latin America will not be solved even if most Latin
American countries become signatories to the MIGA Convention. A further
issue relates to MIGA's effectiveness. Because the MIGA Convention has
numerous incentives and compromises built into it regarding Latin
America and other reluctant developing countries, its ability to attract for-
eign investors and, furthermore, protect them adequately may be compro-
mised.193 In the following section, this Note examines specific MIGA
Convention provisions with two questions in mind: (1) will the provision
actually act as an incentive for Latin American countries to become MIGA
Member Countries, and (2) if so, does the benefit of that incentive come at
the expense of MIGA's ability to effectively meet its goal of protecting for-
eign direct investment?
188. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, Annex I. MIGA, as a multilateral organization,
cannot directly participate in ICSID arbitration procedures. Id. However, there is a
strong presumption that any arbitration will be conducted under ICSID rules. Rowat,
supra note 6, at 131.
189. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, Annex II, art. 40); ICSID Convention, supra note
93, art. 51(4).
190. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, Annex II, art. 4. See also Rowat, supra note 6, at
131.
191. Shihata, supra note 4, at 12.
192. Id.
193. It is interesting to note that these compromises and incentives were built into
MIGA in order to combat the very principles, e.g., the Calvo Doctrine and the depen-
dency theory, that MIGA promoters have argued are "overvalued." If these doctrines are
indeed overvalued, then why does the MIGA Convention work so diligently to overcome
them?
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1. Article 15: Sovereign Control Provision
MIGA promoters emphasize that Convention provisions recognize host
countries' "sovereign control" over the treatment of foreign direct invest-
ment.194 Article 15 of the MIGA Convention provides that MIGA "shall not
conclude any contract of guarantee before the host government has
approved the issuance of the guarantee by the Agency against the risks
designated for cover."195 Thus, before a foreign investor may obtain cover-
age from MIGA, a Latin American host government must approve not only
MIGA's guarantee but also the investment being made. This provision
could be an attractive incentive for Latin American countries to sign the
Convention. Indeed, why would it not be? It is difficult to differentiate this
provision from ANCOM Decision provisions regarding Member Countries'
common development objectives in regards to foreign investment. As
under the ANCOM Decisions, ANCOM members (and other developing
countries) who join MIGA will have the final say on what is and is not an
appropriate foreign investment for their economies.
Similarly, just as the ANCOM Decisions offered little protection to for-
eign direct investors, so does MIGA's Article 15. Under Article 15, a Latin
American signatory to the Convention can "have its cake and eat it too."
The signatory can expressly condition their approval of both MIGA cover-
age and the MIGA covered investment on acceptance of Calvo Doctrine
principles.1 96
2. Article 11: Covered Risks Provision
Four types of non-commercial risk may be covered by Article 11 of the
MIGA Convention. 197 One of the covered risks is that of expropriation of a
foreign investor's property by a host country.198 Excluded from coverage
are "[m]easures normally taken by governments to regulate their economic
activities such as taxation, environmental and labor legislation as well as
normal measures for the maintenance of public safety."199 The provision
"reflects a sensitivity to [developing/host countries] that may wish to regu-
late economic activity on a nondiscriminatory basis without being accused
of engaging in 'creeping' expropriation."200 Thus, this exclusion is another
incentive offered to Latin American countries in exchange for their ratifica-
tion of the Convention. Again, this incentive may affect MIGA's ability to
effectively protect a foreign investor. MIGA will not provide coverage for
194. Shihata, supra note 4, at 15.
195. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, art. 15.
196. Even more startling in light of claims on behalf of MIGA is the fact that "a mem-
ber government may, if it wishes, limit its use of MIGA's services to the coverage of
investments by its nationals in foreign member countries without necessarily allowing it
to cover foreign investments in its own territory." Shihata, supra note 4, at 15-16.
197. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, art. 11.
198. The Convention contemplates this risk as "encompass[ing] measures attributa-
ble to the host government such as nationalization, confiscation, sequestration, seizure,
attachment and freezing of assets." Commentary, supra note 98, l 14.
199. Id.
200. Rowat, supra note 6, at 129.
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expropriations which do not fit within the parameters of Article 11.201
This may leave the foreign investor uncompensated where a Latin Ameri-
can government can present its expropriation as being "non-
discriminatory."
Another risk covered under Article 11 is "repudiation of government
contracts where the investor has no access to a competent forum, faces
unreasonable delays in a court of law or is unable to enforce a final judicial
or arbitral decision in his favor."202 However, a foreign investor will not be
covered until he or she exhausts local remedies or a given remedy is found
to be unenforceable. 203 This "exhaustion of local remedies" provision
clearly will be attractive to Latin American countries considering becoming
MIGA Member Countries. Indeed, Latin American governments which
insert Calvo clauses into their contracts almost invariably require "exhaus-
tion of local remedies."
This provision, however, is not as attractive to the foreign direct inves-
tor. Under Article 11, the investor will not receive coverage of his or her
loss until local remedies are exhausted. This structure could mean a costly
and time-consuming effort before the investor recoups any of his or her
investment loss. It is hard to see then how MIGA's coverage improves a
foreign investor's situation. Most foreign investors would prefer limiting or
eliminating the need to litigate a claim through the host country's legal
system. Thus, it is questionable (1) whether MIGA makes investing in
Latin America any more attractive than before, and (2) whether MIGA
makes investing in Latin America any less risky than before.
Conclusion
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency was designed to spur for-
eign direct investment in less-developed countries by offering a framework
of legal and economic protections. With regard to Latin American coun-
tries, MIGA's goal may be frustrated by their continued use of the Calvo
Doctrine's national treatment standard and international arbitration prohi-
bition principles.
The Calvo Doctrine, formulated in response to European and Ameri-
can diplomatic intervention in contractual disputes between their investors
and Latin American states, continues to exert a strong influence on Latin
American countries. The dependency theory view of Latin American eco-
nomic development incorporates the Calvo Doctrine into its vision of how
foreign investment should function in Latin American economies. The
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States is also a powerful state-
ment of Calvo principles by lesser-developed countries. Finally, one must
only examine the constitutions and foreign investment laws of Latin Ameri-
can countries in general, and ANCOM members in particular, to see the
201. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, art. 11.
202. Shihata, supra note 4, at 14.
203. MIGA Convention, supra note 3, art. 11(a)(iii).
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continued influence of Calvo's national treatment standard and interna-
tional arbitration prohibitions.
The continued relevance of the Calvo Doctrine to Latin American
investment laws raises serious questions about whether Latin American
nations will become signatories to the MIGA Convention. Considering
ANCOM member countries as a representative sample of Latin America,
the answer can only be that many Latin American nations will not sign the
Convention. Even if some Latin American countries do become signatories
to the MIGA Convention, Calvo principles in their laws and in the MIGA
Convention itself may keep MIGA from effectively meeting its goal of
increasing foreign direct investment flows to Latin America. Most Latin
American countries can be expected to condition their participation on
such requirements as a foreign investor exhausting local remedies. A local
remedies condition gives a foreign investor a very tenuous grasp of MIGA
investment guarantee protection.
The Calvo Doctrine continues to thrive as a socio-political framework
for how foreign investment should fit in Latin American countries. By con-
centrating solely on the economic situation of Latin America, MIGA has
undervalued and misused the Calvo Doctrine to its peril. Unless MIGA
effectively addresses these issues, its prospects in Latin America are dim.

